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Abstract 
Lucas (1988) hypothesised that human capital externalities explain persistent 
productivity growth and become manifest via interactions between workplace 
colleagues. Consistent with the first part of this hypothesis, Fox and Milbourne (2006) 
concluded that an increase in the average level of human capital in Australian 
economics departments raised the research productivity of departmental members. 
This paper tests the robustness of this finding by using a direct, rather than a proxy, 
measure of human capital and confirms the existence of human capital externalities 
within Australian economics departments. But we extend the analysis in two 
important dimensions. Firstly, we investigate the second part of Lucas’ hypothesis by 
testing whether the externality becomes manifest via co-authoring. We find no 
evidence that this type of interaction is associated with higher research productivity, 
especially for higher quality outputs. Secondly, we control for the likely endogeneity 
of one’s peer group via instrumental variables estimation. In this case, we find that the 
peer group effect disappears completely for the highest quality outputs but remains for 
research output more broadly defined.         
*The authors thank participants at the ACE 2012, a seminar at the University of Wollongong and referees for this 
journal for insightful comments on earlier drafts. Remaining errors are ours.  
2 
 
     I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Microeconomists have long recognised that externalities affect economic efficiency. 
Over the last 25 years macroeconomists have also developed an interest in 
externalities, in particular because of their potential for explaining persistent 
productivity differentials among countries. For example Lucas (1988) hypothesised 
that, additional to the usual inputs (technology, physical and human capital), 
production also depends on a human capital externality, which he modelled as 
increasing in the average skill level of workers. Subsequently, there has been some 
interest in identifying and quantifying human capital externalities within workplaces.  
According to this literature, positive human capital externalities within firms 
may emerge from the creation of a team ethos, from information sharing, from skill 
complementarities, and from informal on-the-job training amongst co-workers. The 
existence of positive human capital externalities is suggested by the clustering of 
highly skilled professionals (and non-professionals) in firms and by team dynamic 
effects in professional sport. Conversely, human capital externalities may be negative 
if over-qualified workers are disruptive or if an excessive variation in human capital 
across workers in a firm creates a skills-incompatibility problem which makes it 
difficult to implement training programs, increases the costs of co-ordination and 
communication or promotes fractionalisation within the workplace. In this latter 
scenario more highly skilled workers may discount the productive potential from 
collaborating with their less skilled colleagues.i     
Whilst there is a large body of empirical work that tests for such effects in 
schools, other workplace settings have attracted less attention. Recent exceptions 
include Mas and Moretti (2009) who find evidence of positive productivity spillovers 
among cashiers employed by a supermarket chain in the USA, Guryan et al. (2009) 
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who find no evidence of performance spillovers among male professional golfers on 
the PGA tour, and Borjas and Doran (2012) who find a negative productivity spillover 
on US mathematicians after the large influx of Soviet mathematicians post 1990. Our 
interest lies with the existence of human capital externalities in Australian academia. 
Academics typically possess high levels of human capital which are relatively easily 
identified and so the human capital externality hypothesised by Lucas should be 
measurable within academia. However the literature examining this workplace issue is 
sparse.  
Fox and Milbourne (1999) and Rodgers and Neri (2007) both found that the 
research productivity of academic economists in Australia is associated with their own 
human capital and the characteristics of their departmental environment. Additionally, 
and of most relevance to this study, Fox and Milbourne (2006, from here on referred 
to as FM) found evidence consistent with a positive human capital externality within 
economics departments in Australia. The authors collected survey data from 134 
academics on their human capital and other characteristics, and on the institutional 
environment in which they worked. Human capital data included whether the 
academic had a PhD, the time taken to obtain the PhD and the grade of the Honours 
degree. Institutional data included the individual’s average teaching hours per week, 
average class size and the average number of research grants held per year since the 
first appointment in an academic position.  
The authors calculated various proxy measures of the human capital of the co-
workers of the academics who responded to the questionnaire, all based on their 
lifetime research output. These included the average annual research output of the 
most productive individual, of the three most productive individuals and of the most 
productive quartile in the relevant department.ii The authors concluded, on the basis of 
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Tobit regressions in which the coefficient on the proxy for the average human capital 
of one’s departmental colleagues was statistically significant and positive: "...there are 
human capital externalities so that an increase in the human capital of any individual 
also raises, at the margin, the productivity of others. There is some evidence to 
suggest that the externality is driven primarily by having a small but critical mass of 
researchers, rather than one outstanding individual." (p. 369). 
This paper tests the robustness of this conclusion but differs from FM in 
several important dimensions.  Firstly we examine a different study period and our 
database covers nearly all Australian academic economists rather than just a self-
selected sample who responded to a survey.  Secondly we use direct rather than proxy 
measures for the human capital of one’s departmental colleagues. Thirdly we 
investigate whether the externality becomes manifest via co-authoring among 
departmental peers. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we use instrumental 
variables estimation to test whether the peer effect is robust to the assumption that 
one’s peer group is endogenously rather than randomly determined. iii  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we 
present and discuss our data. In section III we estimate an econometric model of the 
determinants of research productivity. Finally, section IV concludes.   
  
II. DATA 
We identified all academics at the level of Lecturer (Level B) and above in 28 
research active Australian economics departments during the period 1996-2000 and 
constructed a dataset of their research productivity and human capital.iv,v We took 
account of publication time lags by assuming that a given publication was produced 
within the department stated in the affiliation if and only if an author was a member of 
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the department two years prior to the publication year. Publications were classified as 
departmentally co-authored if and only if at least two of the authors appeared on one 
of our departmental staff lists.vi  
We counted only refereed journal publications because we are interested in 
research of a minimum level of quality (Neary, Mirrlees and Tirole, 2003).vii Our 
major source of publications data was the on-line version of EconLit. This database is 
not without limitations (Pomfret and Wang, 2003), a major one being that articles 
with several authors are frequently referenced using the ‘et al.’ convention. 
Consequently relevant articles will be missed unless the first author is included in our 
staff list and a supplementary search is undertaken to reveal the other authors, a 
practice which we followed in every case. We also used sources such as departmental 
reports and CVs to identify articles where the first author is not in our lists but another 
author is. Each of n authors received credit for 1/n of the article.  
We calculated departmental research productivity as the weighted average of 
the research productivities of its members, the weights being the number of years each 
member was in the department from 1996 to 2000. The individual’s research 
productivity was computed as his or her publication output per year resulting from 
work undertaken during the period 1996 through 2000 when the individual was 
employed in the department. We assumed that longer articles imply a larger research 
output and so we took page counts but adjusted these for differences in the mean 
number of words or characters per page.viii  
Any meaningful measure of departmental research productivity must also take 
account of journal quality which is particularly relevant here because co-authorship 
may be more common where colleagues attempt to publish in top tier journals. 
However, measuring journal quality is problematic.ix  Consequently we used two 
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versions of our dataset on departmental research productivity. The first (which we 
term Q1) weights page counts by the impact factors of only the top 159 journals from 
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003), which were derived from citation 
counts for journals published over a ten year period. Ipso facto, this approach 
disregards publications in many other journals which are of insufficient quality. The 
weights also emphasise publications in a small subset of the 159 journals, only 29 of 
which receive a weight greater than 0.1.  
As relatively few Australian academic economists published in top tier 
journals, and on the assumption that any article in a refereed journal is better than no 
article at all, we also used a much larger dataset (termed Q2) which includes articles 
published in any of the 1036 journals covered by EconLit, including the 159 in our Q1 
database. Following Gibson (2000) and Towe and Wright (1995), the journals were 
divided into four groups with journal quality weights of 1.00, 0.64, 0.34 and 0.05, 
respectively. 
One criticism of our methodology is that journal quality weights are only 
imprecise proxies for individual article quality. For example, Oswald (2007) has 
argued that there exists greater quality variation within journals than there exists 
across journals. However Oswald’s analysis is based on only six high quality journals, 
four of which (American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Public 
Economics and Economic Journal) are commonly ranked in the top 20 journals 
worldwide. On the other hand our databases, which include publications in 159 
journals (Q1) and 1036 journals (Q2), are so large that the quality variation within 
journals is likely to be swamped by the quality variation across journals. Nevertheless 
we acknowledge that there will be criticisms of our journal lists and the quality 
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relativities we use. The fact is that any weighting scheme is to a greater or lesser 
extent ad hoc.  Our approach is explicit and replicable using alternate weights.  
Table I presents (alphabetically) our departmental data on research 
productivity and on the percentage of that research output that was co-authored by (at 
least two) departmental colleagues. Column 2 of Table I shows the percentage of 
academics in each department with positive Q1 publications during the study period. 
Because many academics in many departments did not publish at all, we present in 
Column 3 the Q1 research productivities of the subset of academics in each 
department who had positive publications. Column 4 contains departmental Q1 
research productivities for all academics, which range from a minimum of zero to a 
maximum of 0.66 quality-weighted pages per person year. Whilst for all departments 
the productivity figures are much higher for the research active than for all members, 
in some cases by as much as sevenfold (e.g. Macquarie and UTS), the data 
nevertheless highlight the fact that during the study period the large majority of 
Australian academic economists had low research productivity by international 
standards.x  
Column 5 of Table I contains the proportions of the departmental Q1 outputs 
that were co-authored with departmental colleagues and the range is again very wide, 
from a minimum of zero per cent to a maximum of 74.5 per cent. Columns 6-9 of 
Table I contain the corresponding data for Q2 publications. Departments are more 
productive in terms of Q2 publications, with productivity of the research-active 
ranging from 0.19 to 5.40 pages per person per year (Column 7) and that of all 
members ranging from 0.05 to 2.77 (Column 8).  Finally Column 9 contains the 
respective proportions co-authored by colleagues, the range being very similar to that 
for Q1 productivity.  
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{Table I here} 
Table I clearly indicates that research productivity, whether measured for a 
restricted or a much broader collection of journals, was low on average across all 
departments and was driven in most departments by a relatively small group of active 
researchers. These data also suggest that attitudes or traditions towards co-authoring 
with colleagues within departments varied greatly. In some departments, as much as 
75 per cent of all journal articles were authored by departmental colleagues. In other 
departments, such collaboration was simply non-existent.   
Of particular interest to us is whether departmental co-authorship is positively 
related to research productivity. The last row of Columns 5 and 9 in Table I contains 
the simple correlation coefficients between, respectively, Q1 and Q2 departmental 
research productivities and the relevant proportions co-authored. In both cases there is 
a weak negative correlation between these two variables. Thus if positive research 
externalities exist, they do not become manifest via co-authorship between 
departmental colleagues, at least not as measured by simple correlations based on 
department-level data. In the next section we investigate the relationships between 
research productivity, human capital and co-authorship ceteris paribus with data at 
the level of the individual. 
 
III. MODELLING RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY 
In this section we investigate the existence and nature of a human capital externality 
by estimating models of the determinants of research productivity using data for 
individual academics. As a substantial proportion of academic economists in our data 
set have zero publications, we use a Tobit (Type I) model which allows for corner 
solutions. Equation (1) states the hypothesis that research output is related to human 
9 
 
capital, research experience, a human capital externality and a variable for co-
authoring, plus a set of controls:xi 
 
log(output) = max [lower limit,  β0 + β1phd1 + β2phd2 + β3phd3  + β4exp  
+ β5(phd1*exp) + β6(phd2*exp) + β7female + β8prof + β9aspro + β10resuni   
+ β11size + β12studstaff  + β13resexpend  + γ0externality  + γ1co-author + u]       (1) 
 
The lower limit is set just below the logarithm of the smallest positive research output 
in the data set and outputs equal to zero have their logarithms set at this lower limit 
(see Cameron and Trevedi, 2009, Section 16.4.2).xii The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of research output because, unlike research output itself, the logarithm was 
found to be approximately normally distributed over strictly positive output values.  
The error term, u, represents unobservable influences on output and is assumed to be 
Normal(0,σ2).  
The human capital of individual academics is represented by three dummy 
variables, phd1, phd2 and phd3, which equal one if, in the first year between 1996 and 
2000 that the individual was employed in a given department, he or she had a PhD from 
an institution ranked 1-50, 51-150 or ≥151, respectively (in descending quality 
order).xiii  Experience, exp, is the number of years between when the PhD was 
conferred and the last year between 1996 and 2000 that the individual was employed in 
the given economics department. Individuals without a PhD have exp set equal to zero; 
they constitute the benchmark category to which others are compared. The two 
interaction terms allow experience to have a differential effect on research output, 
depending on the quality of the PhD.  
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Several control variables, reflecting characteristics of the individual, are also 
included in the model. The binary variable female, controls for any productivity 
differences between male and female academic economists. Two binary variables 
attempt to control for research ability and ambition to climb the academic ladder: prof, 
which equals one if the individual was a professor when first observed in the 
department, and aspro which equals one if the individual was an associate professor 
when first observed in the department and was awarded a PhD no more than ten years 
earlier. With the inclusion of prof and aspro the variables phd1, phd2 and phd3 better 
reflect the skills and knowledge associated with acquiring the qualification rather than 
the signal attached to the credential.   
There are also control variables that capture attributes of the individual’s work 
environment. The binary variable resuni, which equals one if the individual is 
employed in a research-intensive university, controls for broad institutional differences 
that might affect research productivity, both via recruitment practices and incentives for 
academics to undertake research.xiv The variable size is the average number of 
academics in the department during the period 1996 through 2002. It is included to 
control for the effect of departmental scale on research productivity and on the 
propensity to co-author.xv Studstaff is defined as the number of effective, full-time, 
student units (EFTSU) per full-time equivalent (FTE) member of academic staff, 
measured at the university level and averaged across the years 1993 to 1996, inclusive, 
and is included to control for broad institutional differences in teaching loads which 
have been shown to adversely impact on research productivity.  Resexpend is research 
expenditure (in $000) per FTE academic staff in social sciences, measured in 1998. 
This is a proxy for university support for research at the broad discipline level, which 
includes Economics. xvi 
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Two versions of Equation (1) were estimated using the method of maximum 
likelihood: one with productivity measured in Q1-pages per year, the other with 
productivity measured in Q2-pages per year. The estimated coefficients and their levels 
of significance are displayed in Appendix 2 for Q1 output and Appendix 3 for Q2 
output. The model was first estimated without the externality and co-authoring 
variables. The results appear in the column headed ‘Specification 1’. All the 
coefficients have the expected signs and most are statistically significant. Given the 
nonlinear nature of the Tobit model, the average partial effects (APEs) of the 
explanatory variables are of more interest than the coefficients so Tables II and III 
display the APEs on expected Q1 and Q2 productivity, respectively, of all economists. 
{Table II here} 
{Table III here} 
The APEs of the individual’s human capital and other attributes, for the most 
part, are highly significant. The APEs of the three human capital variables, phd1, phd2 
and phd3, indicate that having a PhD is very important for research productivity, 
particularly a PhD from a top 50 university in the case of Q1 publications. For example, 
in Specification 1 the APEs of phd1, 3.560 and 2.566 in Tables II and III (Row 1) 
respectively, imply that an economist with a PhD from a top 50 university has expected 
research productivity that is approximately (e3.560 =) 35 times larger in the case of Q1 
publications, and approximately (e2.566 =) 13 times larger in the case of Q2 publications, 
than that of an economist without a PhD. These are large effects but as the median 
number of Q1 pages per year is zero and the median number of Q2 pages per year is 0.1 
they are not unreasonably large.  
Productivity declines with the years since the PhD was awarded, by about seven 
per cent per year in the case of Q1 publications and by a little more than three per cent 
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per year for Q2 publications. The APE of female implies that the Q1 and Q2 
productivity of females is about (e-0.471 =) 0.6 and (e-0.388 =) 0.7, respectively, that of 
males.xvii The control variables, prof and aspro, indicate that academic status when first 
observed in the department is directly related to productivity during the following 
years. Compared with other academic economists in our data set, professors are  
(e2.262 =) 9.6 and (e1.090 =) 3.0 times more productive in Q1 and Q2 publications, 
respectively; ‘fast-track’ associate professors are (e0.946 =) 2.6 and (e0.620=) 1.9 times 
more productive, although the former is not statistically significant.  
The APEs of the attributes of the academic’s environment (resuni, size, studstaff 
and resexpend) in general, are not statistically significant, which is partially because 
there is a good deal of multicollinearity among these variables. Furthermore, studstaff 
and resexpend are measured at a more aggregated level than the department whereas 
there can be substantial variation among academics at the same university, and even in 
the same department, in terms of the number of students they teach and the amount of 
research funding they receive.xviii However, as a group, the four variables make a 
statistically significant contribution and so they are retained in the model for control 
purposes. 
 
Human Capital Externality  
Lucas (1988) hypothesised that individual productivity increases with increases 
in the average human capital of one’s workplace peers, so we now investigate whether 
our results are consistent with this hypothesis The parameter of interest in Equation (1) 
is γ0 and a crucial assumption for its unbiased estimation – an assumption made by FM 
and in this paper for the moment – is that the error term in Equation (1) is independent 
of the externality. Fox and Milbourne (2006) found that the research productivity of 
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economists who responded to their survey increased with a proxy measure of the 
human capital of their departmental colleagues, namely their mean annual productivity 
over their lifetime.  
By contrast, in Tables II and III, Specification 2, we include three direct 
measures of the human capital of one’s departmental colleagues, namely the percentage 
of one’s departmental colleagues who have a PhD from a top 50 university (hc1_coll), 
from a university ranked 51-150 (hc2_coll) and from a university of lower rank 
(hc3_coll).xix For Q1 productivity, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of 
one’s colleagues with a PhD from a top 50 university is associated with an increase in 
one’s own productivity of 4.3 per cent. The APE of hc2_coll is 2.9 per cent but is 
statistically significant only at levels of significance in excess of ten per cent. The APE 
of hc3_coll is even smaller and is not statistically significant. Hence the largest 
statistically significant human capital effect is produced primarily by the most highly 
qualified subset of one’s departmental colleagues. 
There is also a statistically significant positive association between the human 
capital of one’s departmental colleagues and Q2 research output although its size is 
smaller and varies little with the quality of the PhD of one’s colleagues: a one 
percentage point increase in the percentage of one’s colleagues with a PhD from a top 
50 university is associated with an increase in one’s own Q2 productivity by 1.9 per 
cent while the APEs of hc2_coll and hc3_coll are 2.0 per cent and 1.7 per cent, 
respectively. All these effects are statistically significant at the five per cent level. 
So far, our results based on a direct measure of the human capital of one’s 
colleagues are consistent with those of FM which are based on an indirect measure of 
their human capital. In this vein, and to further test the robustness of FM’s results, we 
re-estimated our model but replaced educational qualifications of colleagues with the 
14 
 
contemporaneous research productivity of one’s departmental colleagues (the variable 
pub_coll) rather than their lifetime annual average because for a research externality to 
exist, colleagues must be present in the same department during the same period of 
time.    
When pub_coll replaces hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll in Tables II and III 
we get Specification 3. The APE of pub_coll on Q1 productivity is large and 
significant at the ten per cent level: a one-page increase per annum in the 
contemporaneous Q1 output of one’s departmental colleagues is associated with a 
178.8 per cent increase in the individual’s Q1 productivity. Once again, to put this in 
perspective keep in mind that on average academics in our data set have Q1 
productivity of only 0.14 pages per annum and more than 50 per cent of academics 
have no Q1 output at all.  
The APE of pub_coll on Q2 productivity is smaller, though statistically 
significant at the five per cent level: a one-page increase per annum in the 
contemporaneous Q2 output of one’s departmental colleagues is associated with a 
25.4 per cent increase in the individual’s Q2 productivity. The mean and median Q2 
productivities of academic economists in our data set are 0.83 and 0.10 pages per 
annum, respectively, which makes the APE of pub_coll modest in size. This result 
implies that individuals with contemporaneously more research-productive 
departmental colleagues are more productive, ceteris paribus, than individuals with 
colleagues who are less contemporaneously research productive. These results are 
again consistent with those in FM. 
When pub_coll as well as hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll are all included in the 
model (Specification 4 in Tables II and III) the APE of pub_coll on both Q1 and Q2 
productivity is reduced in magnitude compared with Specification 3 and is no longer 
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statistically significant. There is evidently a positive association between the human 
capital and the contemporaneous research productivity of one’s departmental 
colleagues because the APEs of hc1_coll on Q1 and Q2 productivity become smaller, 
and the latter is no longer significantly different from zero. However, the APEs of 
hc2_coll and hc3_coll on both Q1 and Q2 productivity are little changed compared with 
Specification 2. Although these results reinforce the conclusion in FM that the human 
capital effect is associated with the extent to which one’s departmental colleagues are 
research active, our direct measure of the human capital of colleagues is better able to 
explain research productivity than the indirect measure in FM.  
 
Departmental Co-authoring  
Now we turn to the question of whether the human capital effect becomes 
manifest via co-authoring by departmental colleagues. Lucas (1988) conjectured that 
"...human capital accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a 
way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital" (p.19, italics 
ours), and that "The external effects...have to do with the influences people have on 
the productivity of others, so the scope of such effects must have to do with the ways 
various groups interact..." (p.37, italics ours). Of course workplace interactions take 
many forms, most of which are not directly observable. xx However departmental co-
authorship is both observable and measurable. Indeed in at least one department of 
which we are aware research incentive schemes have recently been established to 
encourage such collaboration.  
Hence in Tables II and III, Specification 5, the variables hc1_coll, hc2_coll, 
hc3_coll and pub_coll in Specification 4 are replaced by the variable co-author, which 
is the percentage of each department’s published pages that are co-authored by at least 
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two colleagues from that department. This variable takes the same value for all 
academics in the same department. We find no evidence that co-authoring is associated 
with research productivity. To the contrary, the APE of co-author on both Q1 and Q2 
research productivities is very small and not remotely statistically significant. The 
APEs of the other explanatory variables are approximately the same as in Specification 
1.xxi  
Specification 6 includes both co-author and our direct measures of the human 
capital of one’s departmental colleagues. The APE effect of co-author on Q1 
productivity remains small and statistically insignificant, as it was in Specification 5. 
The APEs of hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll on Q1 productivity retain approximately 
the same magnitudes and levels of significance as in Specification 2. These outcomes 
suggest there is little relationship between the propensity to co-author and the human 
capital of one’s colleagues. However, the situation is a little different with respect to Q2 
productivity in Specification 6 where the APE effect of co-author is small but positive 
and statistically significant at the five per cent level. Also, the APEs of hc1_coll, 
hc2_coll and hc3_coll on Q2 productivity increase slightly and become more 
statistically significant in Specification 6 compared with Specification 2. This is the 
only result in support of the hypothesis that more co-authorship at the departmental 
level enhances the research productivity of individual department members, although 
the effect is small: a one percentage point increase in the percentage of departmental 
output that is co-authored is associated with a one per cent increase in one’s own Q2 
productivity. Hence we find little evidence overall that the human capital externality 
identified in FM and confirmed by the results in this study becomes manifest via 
departmental co-authoring.  
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Endogenous Externality  
So far we have assumed that the composition of one’s departmental peer group 
is exogenously determined. But as many studies have shown, one’s peer group is often 
a choice variable. In this case choices are likely made both by the individual at the time 
he or she is recruited and by the departmental members doing the recruiting, so it is 
quite possible that people with similar, unobservable attributes that influence research 
productivity and their acquired levels of human capital will end up as colleagues in the 
same department. If so then the human-capital externality is endogenous and the results 
reported above are likely to overstate the peer group effect. To obtain an unbiased 
estimator of the effect of the externality on individuals’ productivity we now relax the 
assumption that the error term in Equation (1) is independent of the human capital 
externality. Rather, we augment Equation (1) with a second (reduced-form) equation of 
the form: 
 
externality   = π0 + π1phd1 + π2phd2 + π3phd3  + π4exp  
+ π5(phd1*exp) + π6(phd2*exp) + π7female + π8prof + π9aspro + π10resuni 
+ π11size + π12studstaff  + π13resexpend  + π14IV + v      (2) 
 
where IV is an instrumental variable which is correlated with the human capital of 
one’s colleagues (that is, it is relevant) but is uncorrelated with the error term in 
Equation (1) (that is, it is exogenous).  
We reason that departments in highly prestigious universities will tend to 
attract members who share unobservable but productivity enhancing attributes such as 
motivation to do research. We considered several instruments that are proxies for the 
prestige of the university but which are unlikely to have a direct effect on an 
18 
 
individual’s research productivity once the explanatory variables in Equation (1) are 
taken into account.  We settled on the year in which the university was founded, 
yrfounded, which ranges from 1850 for Sydney University to 1992 for RMIT 
University.  
Since only hc1_coll is significant in Table II, hc2_coll and hc3_coll were 
dropped when assessing the effect of a human capital externality on Q1 research 
productivity.  In other words, for Q1 research productivity, the dependent variable in 
Equation (2) is hc1_coll. The instrument, Yrfounded, passes the relevance test as its 
OLS coefficient in Equation (2) is statistically significant at the ten per cent level (its 
robust p-value is 0.059).  
We re-estimated Specification 2 of the model with the (simplified) peer effect 
treated as exogenous, and then applied IV-Tobit where the peer effect is treated as 
endogenous and yrfounded is the instrumental variable. The APEs appear in columns 
2-5 of Table IV. Whereas the APEs of the other explanatory variables, and their levels 
of significance, are very similar in the Tobit and IV-Tobit models, in the latter model 
the APE of the human capital of one’s colleagues, hc1_coll, is halved in size from 
0.045 to 0.024 and is no longer statistically significant. This result, which is consistent 
with those of related studies such as Evans et al. (1992), suggests that the effect of 
one’s departmental peer group on Q1 research productivity can largely be attributed to 
the choices that individuals make concerning departmental membership.   
{Table IV here} 
For Q2 research productivity, all of hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll are 
significantly different from zero, but not significantly different from one another, in 
Table III so the externality was simplified to hc123_coll (the proportion of one’s 
colleagues with a PhD) in Table IV.  That is, the dependent variable in Equation (2) 
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for Q2 research productivity is hc123_coll. The instrument, Yrfounded, passes the 
relevance test as its OLS coefficient in Equation (2) is statistically significant at the 
five per cent level (its robust p-value is 0.049).  
Specification 2 of the model was estimated, first with the (aggregated) peer 
effect treated as exogenous and then with it treated as endogenous and yrfounded as the 
instrumental variable. The APEs appear in the last four columns of Table IV. The APE 
of the human capital of one’s colleagues is doubled in size and remains statistically 
significant at the five per cent level. A one per cent increase in the human capital of 
one’s colleagues is now associated with a 3.5 (rather than a 1.8) per cent increase in the 
individual’s Q2 research productivity. Therefore, there remains evidence of a human-
capital externality when research output is more broadly defined. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated whether a positive human capital externality 
existed in Australian economics departments from 1996 to 2000, as measured by the 
number of quality-adjusted pages published per year in scholarly journals. We 
extended the work of Fox and Milbourne (2006) by using a direct, rather than an 
indirect, measure of the human capital of one’s departmental colleagues. On the 
assumption that the human capital externality is exogenous, we found that a one 
percentage point increase in the percentage of one’s departmental colleagues with a 
PhD from a top 50 university is associated with an increase in one’s annual research 
productivity of 4.3 per cent for publications in high quality journals, and 1.9 per cent 
for publications in a much broader range of journals. To put this into some 
perspective, for a department with around twenty members, the addition of one more 
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member with a top-50 PhD would be associated with an annual Q1 (Q2) productivity 
increase of around twenty (nine) per cent. 
We also found that the contemporaneous productivity of one’s departmental 
colleagues is associated with a large positive effect on the individual’s productivity, 
which is consistent with the assertion in Fox and Milbourne (2006) that the externality 
is driven primarily by the extent to which one’s departmental colleagues are research 
active. However, once we controlled for the educational qualifications of one’s 
colleagues, the contemporaneous productivity effect was no longer apparent. 
The way in which the association between individual productivity and the 
human capital of departmental colleagues becomes manifest remains unclear but, after 
controlling for other factors, we find no evidence that it does so via departmental co-
authoring. Whilst we have not investigated whether individuals improve their own 
productivity by co-authoring (only whether an environment where co-authoring is 
common has a positive impact on productivity) and there may be other reasons for 
encouraging collaboration between colleagues, this finding casts doubt on the efficacy 
of departmental research incentive schemes which seek to encourage co-authorship as 
a way of boosting research productivity. It is possible that co-authoring is a response 
to workplace conditions or personal attributes that have a negative effect on research 
productivity and which, not being included in the model, impart a negative bias to our 
measure of the effect of co-authoring on productivity. On the other hand, there are 
mechanisms other than co-authoring that may be associated with a human capital 
externality. For example, there may be demonstration effects, peer pressure effects or 
competition to out-publish one’s colleagues among academics with high levels of 
human capital. Alternatively there may be a weaker form of cooperative interaction 
where people contribute to each other’s research output via informal feedback on 
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working papers, in seminars, and so on without requiring ‘payment’ in the form of co-
authorship. Sorting out these influences remains a topic for further research. 
A related question, which we do not investigate here, is whether the wide 
disparities in co-authorship rates across departments observed in the late 1990s have 
persisted in the decade since 2000 when research has become increasingly important 
to career advancement and, if so, why such large differences exist in what might be 
regarded as one aspect of departmental ‘tradition’.  
Our results are based on aggregated research output data that does not 
differentiate by field of research within the economics profession. It is plausible that 
human capital externalities, and the productivity returns to departmental co-authorship 
or other forms of collaboration, are greater in some fields than in others. For example, 
applied microeconomic research requires a sound understanding of the relevant 
theory, data manipulation techniques and econometric capabilities and so may be 
more conducive to departmental collaboration than, say, research on theoretical 
economics. This paper does not investigate this issue, so it is also a topic of future 
research.  
Whilst most of the results in this study are consistent with the existence of a 
positive human capital externality in Australian economics departments, they are 
based on the assumption that departmental peer effects are exogenously determined. 
When we allowed for endogeneity, the effect of the human capital externality 
disappeared completely in the case of Q1 research productivity. This does not imply 
that peer effects are unimportant but rather that the productivity effect is to some 
extent a choice variable under the control of individuals. One possible implication of 
these results is the desirability of departmental members being fully involved in 
recruitment processes so as to maximise the chances that all possible synergies from 
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the exercise of choice by both parties can be realised.  For example, departments 
might invite applicants to the campus for several days so as to allow both parties time 
to get to know each other.   
For Q2 research productivity, the peer effect remains even after controlling for 
endogeneity. This result suggests that in general, increasing the proportion of 
departmental members with a PhD would result in an increase in research productivity 
more broadly defined, not only because individuals with a PhD are more productive 
than those without, but also because individuals with a PhD positively influence the 
productivity of their colleagues.     
Finally, our study (as well as FM) is based on an implicit assumption that 
one’s peer group is comprised of one’s departmental colleagues. But as Manski 
(2000) has noted, the relevant peer group is often not obvious. Indeed our data on co-
authorship in Table I suggests that for many individuals in many departments the 
relevant peer group is not likely to be comprised of only their departmental 
colleagues. If this is so then our results must be treated with considerable caution. 
“However severe the (task of establishing causation) may be when group composition 
is known, the problem becomes insurmountable when group composition is 
unknown” (Manski, 2000, p.129, term in italics ours).  
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Table I  Research Productivity and Co-authorship 1998-2002 
 Q1 Research Productivity Q2 Research Productivity 
Depts Active 
(%) 
Pages 
per yr  
if active 
Pages 
per yr 
(all) 
%Co-
author 
Active 
(%) 
Pages 
per yr  
if active 
Pages 
per yr 
(all) 
%Co-
author 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Adelaide 50 0.40 0.20 2.6 65 2.05 1.34 2.5 
ANU 83 0.80 0.66 11.8 86 2.01 1.73 14.6 
Canberra 17 0.00 0.00 0.0 25 0.19 0.05 11.8 
Curtin 54 0.14 0.07 12.0 82 0.97 0.77 11.6 
Deakin 43 0.18 0.08 6.1 59 1.27 0.76 14.2 
E.Cowan 7 0.03 0.00 0.0 13 0.64 0.08 0.0 
Flinders 30 0.26 0.08 9.4 30 2.37 0.72 11.8 
Griffith 21 0.03 0.01 0.0 64 0.28 0.18 8.7 
JCU 19 2.68 0.50 0.0 34 5.40 1.86 0.0 
LaTrobe 58 0.25 0.15 17.2 68 1.74 1.18 13.0 
Macquarie 14 0.07 0.01 1.6 41 0.72 0.29 3.7 
Melbourne 72 0.55 0.40 6.5 87 3.18 2.77 14.4 
Monash 40 0.48 0.19 1.1 54 1.34 0.73 11.4 
Murdoch 25 0.03 0.01 0.0 55 1.31 0.72 16.9 
NewEng. 62 0.08 0.05 34.8 86 0.50 0.44 6.9 
Newcastle 13 0.04 0.01 0.0 59 0.35 0.21 12.1 
NSW 55 0.69 0.38 12.0 69 2.24 1.55 10.8 
QLD 39 0.08 0.03 0.0 77 1.07 0.83 7.5 
QUT 13 0.10 0.01 0.0 35 0.78 0.28 18.6 
RMIT 19 0.03 0.01 22.9 30 1.08 0.32 73.9 
Sydney 32 0.13 0.04 0.9 66 0.80 0.52 0.4 
Tasmania 69 0.24 0.17 6.1 81 2.69 2.18 12.5 
UTS 13 0.22 0.03 33.3 49 0.40 0.20 36.3 
VUT 12 0.05 0.01 74.5 28 0.38 0.11 61.1 
W Aust 58 1.14 0.66 0.8 70 3.08 2.15 1.3 
W Sydney 29 0.08 0.02 0.0 53 0.64 0.33 2.3 
W’gong 15 0.06 0.01 64.6 61 0.53 0.32 24.2 
         
Correlation    -0.18    -0.27 
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Table II  Average Partial Effects on the log of Q1 Research Productivity of All Academics 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value 
phd1 3.560 0.000 3.295 0.000 3.459 0.000 3.249 0.000 3.564 0.000 3.299 0.000 
phd2 2.432 0.000 2.289 0.000 2.420 0.000 2.300 0.000 2.434 0.000 2.287 0.000 
phd3 2.291 0.000 2.324 0.000 2.303 0.000 2.320 0.000 2.301 0.000 2.335 0.000 
exp -0.068 0.000 -0.070 0.000 -0.065 0.000 -0.068 0.000 -0.069 0.000 -0.070 0.000 
gender -0.471 0.078 -0.510 0.038 -0.469 0.066 -0.496 0.046 -0.468 0.084 -0.507 0.041 
prof 2.262 0.000 2.281 0.000 2.207 0.000 2.256 0.000 2.277 0.000 2.299 0.000 
aspro 0.946 0.151 0.932 0.137 0.943 0.143 0.927 0.138 0.950 0.149 0.933 0.135 
resuni 0.407 0.392 0.000 1.000 0.252 0.602 -0.033 0.927 0.505 0.322 0.128 0.772 
size -0.009 0.592 -0.022 0.122 -0.007 0.655 -0.018 0.168 -0.012 0.497 -0.026 0.086 
studstaff -0.158 0.038 -0.077 0.238 -0.122 0.100 -0.058 0.384 -0.158 0.040 -0.076 0.261 
resexpend 0.003 0.247 0.001 0.563 0.001 0.731 0.000 0.929 0.002 0.309 0.001 0.690 
hc1_coll             0.043 0.018           0.037 0.052           0.045 0.012 
hc2_coll             0.029 0.100           0.032 0.071           0.028 0.097 
hc3_coll             0.008 0.380           0.011 0.264           0.009 0.379 
pub_coll                        1.788 0.091 1.184 0.339                      
intra         0.004 0.725 0.006 0.574 
Standard errors are cluster-robust, where the clustering is by department. 
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Table III  Average Partial Effects on the log of Q2 Research Productivity of All Academics 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value 
phd1 2.566 0.000 2.439 0.000 2.503 0.000 2.410 0.000 2.539 0.000 2.451 0.000 
phd2 1.957 0.000 1.875 0.000 1.928 0.000 1.874 0.000 1.941 0.000 1.874 0.000 
phd3 1.617 0.000 1.559 0.000 1.614 0.000 1.555 0.000 1.601 0.000 1.571 0.000 
exp -0.033 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.031 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.035 0.000 
gender -0.338 0.032 -0.338 0.021 -0.344 0.026 -0.333 0.025 -0.338 0.030 -0.339 0.022 
prof 1.090 0.000 1.102 0.000 1.053 0.000 1.081 0.000 1.092 0.000 1.099 0.000 
aspro 0.620 0.036 0.548 0.058 0.614 0.039 0.544 0.064 0.619 0.036 0.520 0.076 
resuni 0.448 0.119 0.297 0.107 0.341 0.173 0.280 0.055 0.374 0.197 0.383 0.046 
size -0.002 0.862 -0.004 0.630 -0.001 0.937 -0.001 0.895 0.002 0.874 -0.012 0.055 
studstaff -0.013 0.689 0.037 0.206 0.007 0.832 0.045 0.085 -0.010 0.738 0.052 0.103 
resexpend 0.003 0.040 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.023 0.002 0.017 
hc1_coll           0.019 0.046           0.013 0.137           0.029 0.001 
hc2_coll   0.020 0.046           0.021 0.010           0.026 0.007 
hc3_coll   0.017 0.001           0.017 0.000           0.024 0.000 
pub_coll     0.254 0.033 0.209 0.139                     
intra         -0.005 0.298 0.011 0.016 
Standard errors are cluster-robust, where the clustering is by department. 
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Table IV  Average Partial Effects on the log of Research Productivity of All Academics 
 Q1 research productivity Q2 research productivity 
 Tobit p-value IV-Tobit p-value Tobit p-value IV-Tobit p-value 
phd1 3.387 0.000 3.464 0.000 2.452 0.000 2.347 0.000 
phd2 2.289 0.000 2.345 0.000 1.879 0.000 1.811 0.000 
phd3 2.326 0.000 2.309 0.000 1.553 0.000 1.489 0.000 
exp -0.067 0.000 -0.068 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.038 0.000 
gender -0.540 0.033 -0.520 0.050 -0.336 0.024 -0.336 0.019 
prof 2.222 0.000 2.242 0.000 1.102 0.000 1.103 0.000 
aspro 0.926 0.137 0.942 0.143 0.544 0.058 0.477 0.094 
resuni -0.037 0.934 0.209 0.722 0.320 0.089 0.144 0.588 
size -0.022 0.108 -0.018 0.193 -0.003 0.699 -0.002 0.823 
studstaff -0.097 0.121 -0.120 0.094 0.036 0.192 0.076 0.142 
resexpend 0.001 0.511 0.002 0.383 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.031 
hc1_coll 0.045 0.003 0.024 0.530     
hc123_coll     0.018 0.000 0.035 0.032 
Standard errors are cluster-robust where the clustering is by department 
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Appendix 1 
 
Variable/Acro
nym 
Definition 
phd1 A dummy variable = 1 if, in the first year from 1996-2000 that the 
individual was employed in the department, he/she had a Ph.D 
from an institution ranked 1-50 in Kalaitzidakis (2003). 
phd2 A dummy variable = 1 if, in the first year from 1996-2000 that the 
individual was employed in the department, he/she had a Ph.D 
from an institution ranked 51-150 in Kalaitzidakis (2003). 
phd3 A dummy variable = 1 if, in the first year from 1996-2000 that the 
individual was employed in the department, he/she had a Ph.D 
from an institution ranked 150 or greater in Kalaitzidakis (2003). 
exp Years between conferral of the Ph.D and the last year from 1996-
2000 that the individual was employed in the department. 
female A dummy variable = 1 if the individual is a female. 
prof A dummy variable = 1 if the individual was a professor when first 
observed in the department. 
aspro A dummy variable = 1 if the individual was an associate professor 
when first observed in the department and was awarded a Ph.D no 
more than ten years earlier. 
resuni A dummy variable = 1 if the individual was employed in a research 
intensive university, i.e. Adelaide, ANU, Melbourne, Monash, 
NSW, Queensland, Sydney, Tasmania or UWA. 
size The average number of academics in the department from 1996 to 
2002 
studstaff The number of effective, full-time, student units per full-time 
equivalent  (FTE) member of academic staff, measured at the 
university level and averaged across the years 1993 to 1996.  
resexpend Resexpend is research expenditure (in $000) per FTE academic 
staff in social sciences, measured in 1998. 
hc1_coll The percentage of departmental colleagues with a Ph.D from a 
university ranked 1-50 in Kalaitzidakis (2003). 
hc2_coll The percentage of departmental colleagues with a Ph.D from a 
university ranked 51-150 in Kalaitzidakis (2003). 
hc3_coll The percentage of departmental colleagues with a Ph.D from a 
university ranked 151 or greater in Kalaitzidakis (2003). 
pub_coll The contemporaneous research productivity of an individual’s 
departmental colleagues. 
co-author The percentage of departmental published pages that involve co-
authoring with at least one colleague from the same department. 
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Appendix 2 Tobit Estimation of the log of Q1 Research Productivity 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 12.393 0.000 11.706 0.000 12.112 0.000 11.576 0.000 12.409 0.000 11.715 0.000 
phd2 9.661 0.000 9.236 0.000 9.574 0.000 9.232 0.000 9.678 0.000 9.239 0.000 
phd3 8.814 0.000 8.816 0.000 8.774 0.000 8.772 0.000 8.859 0.000 8.862 0.000 
exp -0.124 0.009 -0.136 0.003 -0.117 0.019 -0.133 0.005 -0.125 0.007 -0.138 0.002 
exp*phd1 -0.150 0.040 -0.125 0.071 -0.144 0.043 -0.123 0.075 -0.148 0.040 -0.122 0.076 
exp*phd2 -0.064 0.380 -0.056 0.425 -0.065 0.370 -0.057 0.417 -0.063 0.390 -0.054 0.440 
gender -1.354 0.106 -1.469 0.063 -1.346 0.094 -1.425 0.072 -1.343 0.113 -1.461 0.067 
prof 4.975 0.000 5.010 0.000 4.868 0.000 4.962 0.000 5.001 0.000 5.042 0.000 
aspro 2.402 0.098 2.369 0.089 2.392 0.093 2.356 0.090 2.413 0.096 2.372 0.088 
resuni 1.101 0.398 0.000 1.000 0.683 0.606 -0.089 0.927 1.364 0.330 0.345 0.774 
size -0.025 0.597 -0.059 0.127 -0.019 0.657 -0.049 0.169 -0.034 0.505 -0.071 0.092 
studstaff -0.427 0.038 -0.209 0.250 -0.330 0.100 -0.158 0.391 -0.428 0.041 -0.207 0.274 
resexpend 0.007 0.240 0.003 0.557 0.002 0.729 0.000 0.928 0.006 0.301 0.002 0.687 
hc1_coll            0.117 0.011              0.100 0.041               0.121 0.007 
hc2_coll            0.079 0.108              0.085 0.074               0.076 0.105 
hc3_coll            0.022 0.372              0.029 0.256               0.024 0.371 
pub_coll                         4.849 0.095 3.205 0.344                           
co-author         0.010 0.726 0.015 0.576 
constant -11.336 0.002 -17.134 0.000 -13.110 0.000 -18.356 0.000 -11.322 0.002 -17.195 0.000 
sigma 6.465 0.000 6.372 0.000 6.424 0.000 6.357 0.000 6.463 0.000 6.367 0.000 
log-like’d -1182 
 
-1173 
 
-1179 
 
-1172 
 
-1181 
 
-1173 
 Standard errors are cluster-robust, where the clustering is by department. 
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Appendix 3 Tobit Estimation of the log of Q2 Research Productivity 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 5.396 0.000 5.130 0.000 5.279 0.000 5.080 0.000 5.343 0.000 5.143 0.000 
phd2 4.309 0.000 4.131 0.000 4.241 0.000 4.115 0.000 4.273 0.000 4.135 0.000 
phd3 3.376 0.000 3.246 0.000 3.347 0.000 3.228 0.000 3.338 0.000 3.276 0.000 
exp -0.022 0.253 -0.030 0.119 -0.019 0.328 -0.028 0.154 -0.024 0.222 -0.029 0.127 
exp*phd1 -0.089 0.000 -0.081 0.001 -0.087 0.000 -0.080 0.001 -0.088 0.000 -0.079 0.001 
exp*phd2 -0.052 0.025 -0.049 0.028 -0.051 0.028 -0.048 0.031 -0.052 0.025 -0.048 0.031 
gender -0.613 0.042 -0.613 0.029 -0.625 0.034 -0.603 0.034 -0.614 0.039 -0.615 0.031 
prof 1.698 0.000 1.716 0.000 1.645 0.000 1.685 0.000 1.701 0.000 1.712 0.000 
aspro 1.023 0.026 0.912 0.046 1.011 0.029 0.906 0.051 1.021 0.026 0.869 0.062 
resuni 0.769 0.115 0.514 0.103 0.588 0.174 0.484 0.054 0.644 0.193 0.660 0.042 
size -0.003 0.862 -0.006 0.629 -0.001 0.937 -0.002 0.895 0.003 0.874 -0.020 0.051 
studstaff -0.023 0.689 0.064 0.202 0.011 0.832 0.079 0.083 -0.018 0.739 0.091 0.097 
resexpend 0.005 0.041 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.021 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.024 0.004 0.017 
hc1_coll            0.034 0.041              0.022 0.135            0.051 0.001 
hc2_coll            0.035 0.052              0.036 0.011            0.046 0.008 
hc3_coll            0.030 0.001              0.030 0.000            0.043 0.000 
pub_coll                        0.443 0.033 0.365 0.135                        
co-author         -0.009 0.292 0.020 0.015 
constant -6.038 0.000 -9.182 0.000 -6.810 0.000 -9.579 0.000 -6.038 0.000 -10.504 0.000 
sigma 2.754 0.000 2.730 0.000 2.741 0.000 2.723 0.000 2.753 0.000 2.722 0.000 
log-like’d -1331 
 
-1322 
 
-1329 
 
-1321 
 
-1330 
 
-1320 
 Standard errors are cluster-robust, where the clustering is by department. 
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i See Battu et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion of positive and negative human capital externalities 
within workplaces in Great Britain.  
ii See Fox and Milbourne (1999) for details on the questionnaire used and the data thereby obtained. 
iii FM do not control for peer group endogeneity, as they note in their footnote 1. However in their 
conclusion they dismiss this omission: “As our modelling approach controls for individual 
characteristics when examining the explanatory power of colleagues’ research output, we are not 
simply capturing the tendency of research-intensive economics departments to hire academic staff with 
high research output or potential” (p.369). We believe it is unlikely that all relevant explanatory 
variables can be included in a single equation model and so we believe that our instrumental variables 
approach makes a useful contribution in this area.    
iv We excluded the following universities either because they did not offer a doctoral degree in 
economics or because of data limitations: Australian Defence Force Academy, Charles Darwin, Charles 
Sturt, Swinburne University of Technology, Southern Cross and the University of Southern 
Queensland. 
v We acknowledge that our study period is somewhat dated. However one advantage of this is that we 
have established a benchmark, in a period where research productivity was less emphasised than it is 
currently (by, for example, the ERA 2012 departmental rankings).  Hence subsequent investigations 
into this area will be able to investigate whether the additional institutional attention and funding 
devoted to increasing research productivity has paid dividends. 
vi In cases where a co-author had the same Australian economics department affiliation but did not 
appear on our staff list, we assumed the person to be a student or academic from another department or 
research centre within the same university.   
vii This is supported by research suggesting that the returns to non-refereed publications are low, at least 
in other countries. See Gibson (2000) and Sauer (1988). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the 
decision to focus entirely on journal articles is controversial.  
viii Our analysis is based on ‘standardised’ pages calculated with page-conversion factors for 391 
journals provided to us by Sinha and Macri (2002). For other journals we used the average conversion 
factor of all 'group 4 journals' in Sinha and Macri (2002). The reference journal, with a weight of one, 
is the American Economic Review. 
ix See Neary, Mirrlees and Tirole (2003), Figure 1 for an illustrative summary of the wide range of 
weighting schemes used in the literature to take account of journal quality. See also Combes and 
Linnemer (2003), Lubrano et al. (2003), Axarlaglou and Theoharakis (2003),  Mason, Steagall and 
Fabritius (1997) and Thursby (2000).    
x See Combes and Linnemer (2003), Lubrano et al. (2003) and Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) for 
international rankings. 
xi See Appendix 1 for definitions of all variables and acronyms used in this paper. 
xii The Tobit I model assumes that each explanatory variable has the same effect on the probability of 
publishing as on the (log of the) number of pages published, given some publications were achieved. 
We checked this following the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2009, p.595). A Probit model with 
the same explanatory variables was estimated and found to have coefficients with the same sign and of 
approximately the same magnitude as those of the Tobit I model. 
xiii We used the rankings of PhD granting institutions in Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) after confirming 
their stability over time using the rankings of Hirsch et al. (1984). 
xiv The research intensive universities in our study are Adelaide, ANU, Melbourne, Monash, New South 
Wales, Queensland, Sydney, Tasmania and Western Australia.  
xv The inclusion of the variable size takes account of the fact that large departments offer more 
opportunity for co-authoring than small departments. If productivity is inversely related to department 
size ceteris paribus, and if more co-authoring occurs in large departments than in small departments, 
then excluding size would create a downward bias in the estimated effect of co-authoring. A better 
control would be the number of departmental colleagues with the same field of interest or with 
complementary skills, but the data on these characteristics are not available. 
xvi The last two explanatory variables in our model, externality and co-author, are discussed below.  
xvii This result may be due to female academics experiencing more career disruptions, and/or having 
higher teaching loads, than their male departmental colleagues. Due to data limitations our model does 
not control for either of these variables.  
xviii In separate regressions, results from which are not reported here, we included size2 and exp2 in an 
attempt to control for possible non-linear effects of departmental size and individual experience on 
research productivity. The coefficient estimate on size2 was statistically insignificant. The coefficient 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                            
estimate on exp2 was significant at the 5 per cent level but was positive in sign and so small in 
magnitude as to be of no practical concern.   
xix The residual category is the proportion of one’s co-workers without a PhD. 
xx We assume that professional interactions in academia occur for the purpose of production rather than 
consumption.  
xxi This result is unchanged if the percentage of departmental research output that is co-authored with 
colleagues external to the department is included in the model. 
